The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players
This article proves that if each player’s measure of absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing in his/her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the general rent-seeking game, where risk-averse players can coexist with risk-neutral players, attitude toward risk can differ among players, and concave production functions for lotteries are not necessarily the same among players.
KeywordsRent-seeking Nonincreasing absolute risk aversion Uniqueness
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