Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses

Public Choice volume 140, pages 1–13 (2009)Cite this article

Abstract

Coase (Journal of Low and Economics 17(2):185–213, 1974) failed to appreciate that the construction and maintenance of nineteenth-century lighthouses were in part financed by British taxpayers. Bertrand (Cambridge Journal of Economics 30:389–402, 2006) rightly calls him to account. While agreeing with Bertrand’s conclusion, we dispute her reasoning and argue that lighthouses nevertheless could have been supplied by the private sector.

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Author information

Affiliations

  1. Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair, College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans, 6363 St. Charles Ave., Box 15, Miller 321, New Orleans, LA, 70118, USA

    Walter Block

  2. Joseph A. Butt, S. J. College of Business Administration, Loyola University New Orleans, 6363 St. Charles Ave., New Orleans, LA, 70118, USA

    William Barnett II

Authors
  1. Walter Block
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  2. William Barnett II
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Correspondence to Walter Block.

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Block, W., Barnett, W. Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses. Public Choice 140, 1–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9375-x

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Keywords

  • Lighthouse
  • Market failure
  • Public goods
  • Coase
  • Bertrand

JEL Classification

  • H41