Public Choice

, Volume 137, Issue 3–4, pp 507–522 | Cite as

Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits

  • Michael C. MungerEmail author


Assesses the arguments for the use of market, or political, processes for making collective choices. The border between “what is mine” and “what is ours” is contested, but it is unguarded. Where should it lie? How would we know when it should be adjusted? I uncover an old paradox: A society can never use political means to guard against incursions across the border for political ends. Some other mechanism, such as constitutional or other extra-statutory rules, are required.


Political economy Politics Market processes Risk 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Duke UniversityDurhamUSA

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