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Public Choice

, Volume 135, Issue 3–4, pp 257–276 | Cite as

Social preferences and private provision of public goods: A ‘double critical mass’ model

  • Angelo Antoci
  • Pier Luigi Sacco
  • Luca ZarriEmail author
Article

Abstract

We set up an evolutionary game-theoretic model aimed at addressing the issue of local public good provision via direct commitment of voluntary forces (private donors and nonprofit providers) only. Two classes of agents are assumed to strategically interact within a ‘double critical mass’ model and we investigate the critical factors affecting the dynamic outcomes of such interaction. Further, we explore the conditions under which (what we term) ‘evolutionary crowding-out/in’ occurs, depending on agents’ degree of opportunism, social comparison and positive selective incentives (such as subsidies given by the government to ‘virtuous’ citizens or nonprofits only).

Keywords

Double critical mass Evolutionary crowding-out Privately provided public goods Prosocial emotions Social preferences 

JEL

C73 H41 L30 Z13 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Economics and BusinessUniversity of SassariSassariItaly
  2. 2.DADIIUAVVeniceItaly
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsUniversity of VeronaVeronaItaly

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