Public Choice

, Volume 134, Issue 3–4, pp 231–246 | Cite as

A power measure analysis of Amendment 36 in Colorado

Article

Abstract

Colorado’s Amendment 36 proposed to switch Colorado’s representation in the Electoral College from winner-takes-all to proportionality. We evaluate unilateral and uniform switches to proportionality both from Colorado’s perspective and from an impartial perspective on the basis of a priori and a posteriori voting power measures. The present system is to be preferred to a unilateral switch from any perspective on any measure. A uniform switch is to be preferred to the present system from Colorado’s perspective on an a priori measure, and from an impartial perspective on an a posteriori measure. The present system is to be preferred to a uniform switch from Colorado’s perspective on an a posteriori measure (with some qualifications), and from an impartial perspective on an a priori measure. We conclude with a discussion of the appropriateness of these measures.

Keywords

US presidential elections Colorado’s Amendment 36 A priori and a posteriori measures of voting power Mean majority deficit 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Philosophy, Faculty 14University of DortmundDortmundGermany
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodLondon School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK

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