Public Choice

, Volume 133, Issue 3–4, pp 457–477 | Cite as

The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy



We evaluate the impact of political forces in the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Portugal, as it matured from a young to an established democracy. Using a large and unexplored dataset we show that political variables condition the granting system, and that their importance changed over time. While tactical manipulation in the distribution of grants among municipalities seems to exist only in the early years of democracy, opportunistic effects are stronger in the latter years. We argue that the latter effect is due to a change in the political environment and to the electorate’s lack of information on intergovernmental grants.


Grants Intergovernmental relations Political economy Portugal 


H77 H59 D72 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoBragaPortugal
  2. 2.Faculdade de EconomiaUniversidade do PortoPortoPortugal

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