Public Choice

, Volume 133, Issue 3–4, pp 377–391 | Cite as

Determinants of interest group formation

  • Dennis Coates
  • Jac C. Heckelman
  • Bonnie WilsonEmail author


It is widely recognized that interest groups affect both microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. However, few researchers have attempted to discern empirically the factors that contribute to interest group activity. This paper provides a test of several theories of group formation in a panel setting. A nation’s stability, socioeconomic development, political system, size, and diversity all appear to contribute to interest group formation, as predicted by theory.


Interest groups Formation 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dennis Coates
    • 1
  • Jac C. Heckelman
    • 2
  • Bonnie Wilson
    • 3
    Email author
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of Maryland Baltimore CountyBaltimoreUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsWake Forest UniversityWinston SalemUSA
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsSaint Louis UniversitySaint LouisUSA

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