Public Choice

, Volume 133, Issue 1–2, pp 107–110 | Cite as

Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment

  • Thomas Stratmann
  • Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo
Article

Abstract

Campaign finance regulation is an important issue for democracies. Proponents of stricter contribution limits believe it will improve competitiveness. Opponents argue that contribution caps are just a mask for incumbency protection. This paper comments on John Lott’s 2006 article in “Campaign Finance Reform and Electoral Competition” in Public Choice.

Keywords

Campaign contribution limits Competitiveness of candidate elections 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, BV 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Stratmann
    • 1
  • Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo
    • 2
  1. 1.James M. Buchanan CenterGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  2. 2.CIDE - División de Estudios PolíticosTolucaMexico

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