Campaign finance reform and electoral competition: Comment
Campaign finance regulation is an important issue for democracies. Proponents of stricter contribution limits believe it will improve competitiveness. Opponents argue that contribution caps are just a mask for incumbency protection. This paper comments on John Lott’s 2006 article in “Campaign Finance Reform and Electoral Competition” in Public Choice.
KeywordsCampaign contribution limits Competitiveness of candidate elections
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