Public Choice

, Volume 132, Issue 1–2, pp 191–208 | Cite as

Strategic ratification

Original Article


Previous models of ratifier effects have relied on restrictive assumptions regarding the dimensionality of the choice space and the preferences and rationality of actors. These assumptions can lead to an underestimation of the importance of ratifiers and a mischaracterization of their role. A model presented here responds to these concerns and finds that when ratifiers are strategic, ratification requirements consistently aid negotiators in settings where previous models find no effects. Furthermore, new relations between the types of ratifier and the strength of their influence are identified. Negotiators benefit from in-group homogeneity on dimensions along which negotiators agree and from internal dissension on dimensions along which negotiators disagree.

Ratification International negotiation Bargaining 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Columbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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