Public Choice

, Volume 127, Issue 1–2, pp 177–206 | Cite as

Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?

  • Thomas Stratmann
  • Francisco J.
  • Aparicio-Castillo
Articles
Accepted:

Abstract

This paper examines whether campaign contribution restrictions have consequences for election outcomes. States are a natural laboratory to examine this issue. We analyze elections to Assemblies from 1980 to 2001 and determine whether candidates' vote shares are altered by changes in state campaign contribution restrictions. We find that limits on giving narrow the margin of victory of the winning candidate. Limits lead to closer elections for future incumbents, but have less effect on the margin of victory of incumbents who passed the campaign finance legislation. We also find some evidence that contribution limits increase the number of candidates in the race.

Keywords

Public Finance Election Outcome Competition Policy Vote Share State Campaign 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Angrist, J. (1991). Grouped-data estimation and testing in simple labor-supply models. Journal of Econometrics, 47, 243–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Ansolabehere, S., de Figueredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. (2003). Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), Winter, 105–130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Austen-Smith, D. (1987). Interest groups, campaign contributions and probabilistic voting. Public Choice, 54, 123–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bronars, S. G., & Lott, J. R. Jr. (1997). Do campaign donations alter how a politician votes? Or, do donors support candidates who value the same things that they do? Journal of Law and Economics, 40(2), 317–350.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Coate, S. (2004a). Political competition with campaign contributions and informative advertising. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5), 772–804.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Coate, S. (2004b). Pareto-improving campaign finance policy. The American Economic Review, 94(3), 628–655.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Feigenbaum, E. D., & Palmer, J. A. (1980–2000). Campaign Finance Law, Federal Election Commission, Bi-Annual Issues.Google Scholar
  8. Gierzynski, A., & Breaux, D. (1991). Money and votes in state legislative election. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16, 203–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Green, D., & Krasno, J. (1988). Salvation of the spendthrift incumbent: Reestimating the effects of campaign spending in House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 32, 363–372.Google Scholar
  10. Grier, K. B. (1989). Campaign spending and senate elections, 1978–1984. Public Choice, 63(3), 201–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Grier, K. B., & Munger M. C. (1991). Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions. Economic Inquiry, 29, 24–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Gross, D. A., Goidel, R. K., & Shields, T. G. (2002). State campaign finance regulations and electoral competition. American Politics Research, 30(2), 143–165.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Hogan, R. (2000). The Costs of Representation in State Legislatures: Explaining Variations in Campaign Spending, Social Science Quarterly, 81(4), 941–956.Google Scholar
  14. Jacobson, G. (1978). The effects of campaign spending on congressional elections. American Political Science Review, 72, 469–491.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Kettl, D., et al. (1997). Report of the Commission, Vol. I, Governor's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Campaign Finance Reform, State of Wisconsin.Google Scholar
  16. Kousser, T., & LaRaja, R. (2000). How Do Campaign Finance Laws Shape Fundraising Patterns and Electoral Outcomes? Evidence from the States, Working paper.Google Scholar
  17. Kroszner, R. S., & Stratmann, T. (1998). Interest group competition and the organization of congress: Theory and evidence from financial services' political action committees. American Economic Review, 88, 1163–1187.Google Scholar
  18. Levitt, S. (1994). Using repeat challengers to estimate the effect of campaign spending on election outcomes in the U.S. house. Journal of Political Economy, 103, 777–798.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Lott, J. R. (1987). The effect of nontransferable property rights on the efficiency of political markets. Journal of Public Economics, 31(2), 231–246.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Malbin, M. J., & Gais, T. L. (1998). The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States. Rockefeller Institute Press.Google Scholar
  21. Mayer, K. (1998). Public Financing and Electoral Competition in Minnesota and Wisconsin, University of Southern California.Google Scholar
  22. Milyo, J. (1997). The economics of campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers. Public Choice, 93, 245–270.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Milyo, J., Primo, D., & Groseclose, T. (2002). The Effects of State Campaign Finance Regulation on Turnout, Electoral Competition, and Partisan Advantage in Gubernatorial Elections, 1949–1998, Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
  24. Milyo, J., & Groseclose, T. (1999). The electoral effects of incumbent wealth. Journal of Law and Economics, 42(2), 699–722.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Mueller, D. C., & Stratmann, T. (1994). Informative and persuasive campaigning. Public Choice, 81(1), 55–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Ortuno-Ortin, I., & Schultz, C. (2000). Public Funding for Political Parties, CESifo Working Paper No. 368.Google Scholar
  27. Potters, J., Sloof, R., & van Winden, F. (1997). Campaign expenditures, contributions, and direct endorsements: The strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior. European Journal of Political Economy, 13, 1–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Prat, A. (2002a). Campaign advertising and voter welfare. Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), 999–1017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Prat, A. (2002b). Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies. Journal of Economic Theory, 103(1), 162–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Ramsden, G. P. (2002). State legislative campaign finance research: A review essay. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 2(2), 176–198.Google Scholar
  31. Redfield, K. D. (1995). Cah clout: Political Money in Illinois Legislative Elections. University of Illinois at Springfield.Google Scholar
  32. Redfield, K. D. (2001). Money Counts: How Dollars Dominate Illinois Politics and What We Can Do About It. Institute for Public Affairs, University of Illinois at Springfield.Google Scholar
  33. Snyder, J. M., Jr. (1992). Long-term investing in politicians: Or, give early, give often. Journal of Law and Economics, 35, 15–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Smith, B. A. (1995). Campaign Finance Regulation: Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences. Cato Policy Analysis, 238.Google Scholar
  35. Stratmann, T. (1991). What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. Southern Economic Journal, 57, 606–664.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Stratmann, T. (1992). Are contributions rational? Untangling strategies of political action committees. Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), 647–664.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Stratmann, T. (1995). Campaign contributions and congressional voting: Does the timing of contributions matter? Review of Economics and Statistics, 72(1).Google Scholar
  38. Stratmann, T. (1998). The market for congressional votes: Is the timing of contributions everything? Journal of Law and Economics, 41, 85–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Thompson, J. A., & Moncrief, G. F. (eds.) (1998). Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections. Congressional Quarterly Books.Google Scholar
  40. Wittman, D. (2002). Candidate Quality, Pressure Group Endorsements, and Uninformed Voters, Unpublished manuscript, University of California, Santa Cruz.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Stratmann
    • 1
  • Francisco J.
  • Aparicio-Castillo
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsGeorge Mason UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Political Studies DivisionCIDEMexico

Personalised recommendations