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Public Choice

, Volume 125, Issue 3–4, pp 271–303 | Cite as

Interest group size dynamics and policymaking

  • Vjollca Sadiraj
  • Jan Tuinstra
  • Frans Van Winden
Article

Abstract

We present a dynamic model of endogenous interest group sizes and policymaking. The model integrates ‘top-down' (policy) and `bottom-up' (individual and social-structural) influences on the development of interest groups. Comparative statics results show that the standard assumption of fixed-sized interest groups can be misleading. Furthermore, dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that reliance on equilibrium results can also be misleading since equilibria may be unstable. Complicated dynamics may then emerge naturally, leading to erratic time patterns for policy and interest group sizes. Our model can endogenously generate the types of spurts and declines in organizational density reported in empirical studies.

Keywords

Empirical Study Group Size Static Result Dynamic Analysis Public Finance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vjollca Sadiraj
    • 1
  • Jan Tuinstra
    • 2
  • Frans Van Winden
    • 3
  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA
  2. 2.CeNDEF and Department of Quantitative EconomicsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.CREED and Department of EconomicsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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