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Public Choice

, Volume 125, Issue 1–2, pp 203–213 | Cite as

Public choice and political philosophy: Reflections on the works of Gordon Spinoza and David Immanuel Buchanan

  • Hartmut Kliemt
Article

Abstract

The paper explores some of the surprisingly many relations between theories of public choice and political philosophy. Focusing on variants of Homo oeconomicus it does so systematically rather than historically. But it factors in the history of the two disciplines along with some recent developments in (experimental) economics. This sheds new light on the counterfactual assumption that in politics everybody should be supposed to be a knave and suggests that we better seek factually sound behavioral foundations for Public Choice.

Keywords

Public Finance Public Choice Political Philosophy Counterfactual Assumption Behavioral Foundation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Duisburg-EssenDuisburgGermany

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