Public Choice

, Volume 123, Issue 1–2, pp 1–18 | Cite as

Thinking About the Political Impacts of the Electoral College

  • Bernard GrofmanEmail author
  • Scott L. Feld


Public Finance Electoral College Political Impact 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Social SciencesUniversity of CaliforniaIrvine
  2. 2.Department of SociologyPurdue UniversityUSA

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