Public Choice

, Volume 124, Issue 3–4, pp 249–266 | Cite as

Non-binding linked-issues referenda: Analysis and an application

  • Timo GoeschlEmail author


Non-binding referenda (‘petitions') are an instrument of direct democracy that allows citizens to signal preferences to politicians outside the electoral cycle. This paper provides a simple theoretical and empirical analysis of a particular form of non-binding referenda, so-called linked-issues petitions. It analyzes the ability of issue linkage to increase participation levels above those of single-issue petitions and applies the analytical insights to a controversial referendum held in Austria in 2002 that linked issues of transboundary nuclear risk and Eastern enlargement of the European Union.


Empirical Analysis Public Finance Direct Democracy Electoral Cycle Participation Level 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Agricultural and Applied EconomicsUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonMadisonU.S.A.

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