Public Choice

, Volume 121, Issue 1–2, pp 213–238 | Cite as

The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock

  • Roger D. Congleton


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Selected references: Gordon Tullock.

  1. Lockard, A.A. and Tullock, G. (2001). Efficient rent seeking: Chronicle of an intellectual quagmire. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  2. Tullock, G., Seldon, A. and Brady, G.L. (2000). Government: Whose obedient servant?: A primer in public choice. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.Google Scholar
  3. Tullock, G. (1997). The case against the common law. Durham: North Carolina Academic Press.Google Scholar
  4. Tullock, G. (1997). Economics of income redistribution. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  5. Brady, G.L. and Tollison, R.D. (Eds.). (1994). On the trail of homo economicus: Essays by Gordon Tullock. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Tullock, G. (1994). The economics of nonhuman societies. Tucson: Pallas Press.Google Scholar
  7. Grier, K.B. and Tullock, G. (1989). An empirical analysis of cross-national economic growth, 1951–80. Journal of Monetary Economics 24: 259–276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Tullock, G. (1989). The economics of special privilege and rent seeking. Hingham, MA: Lancaster and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  9. Tullock, G. (1987). Autocracy. Hingham, MA: Lancaster and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  10. Tullock, G. (1986). The economics of wealth and poverty. New York: New York University Press; (distributed by Columbia University Press).Google Scholar
  11. Tullock, G. (1985). Adam Smith and the prisoners’ dilemma, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1073–1081.Google Scholar
  12. McKenzie, R.B. and Tullock, G. (1985). The new world of economics: Explorations into the human experience. Homewood, IL: Irwin.Google Scholar
  13. Brennan, G. and Tullock, G. (1982). An economic theory of military tactics: Methodological individualism at war. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3: 225–242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Tullock, G. (1981). The rhetoric and reality of redistribution. Southern Economic Journal 47: 895–907.Google Scholar
  15. Tullock, G. (1981). Why so much stability? Public Choice 37: 189–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Tullock, G. (1980). Trials on trial: The pure theory of legal procedure. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In J.M. Buchanan, R.D. Tollison, and G. Tullock. Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97–112. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Tullock, G. (1979). When is inflation not inflation: A note. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11: 219–221.Google Scholar
  19. Tullock, G. (1977). Economics and sociobiology: A comment. Journal of Economic Literature 15: 502–506.Google Scholar
  20. Tideman, T.N. and Tullock, G. (1976). A new and superior process for making social choices. Journal of Political Economy 84: 1145–1159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Tullock, G. (1975). The transitional gains trap. Bell Journal of Economics 6: 671–678.Google Scholar
  22. Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1975). Polluters’ profits and political response: Direct controls versus taxes. American Economic Review 65: 139–147.Google Scholar
  23. Tullock, G. (1974). The social dilemma: The economics of war and revolution. Blacksburg: University Publications.Google Scholar
  24. Tullock, G. (1972). Explorations in the theory of anarchy. Blacksburg: Center for the Study of Public Choice.Google Scholar
  25. Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1971/1962). The calculus of consent: Logical foundations of constitutional democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  26. Tullock, G. (1971). The charity of the uncharitable. Western Economic Journal 9: 379–392.Google Scholar
  27. Tullock, G. (1971). Inheritance justified. Journal of Law and Economics 14: 465–474.Google Scholar
  28. Tullock, G. (1971). The paradox of revolution. Public Choice 11: 88–99.Google Scholar
  29. Tullock, G. (1971). Public decisions as public goods. Journal of Political Economy 79: 913–918.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Tullock, G. (1971/1988). The logic of the law. Fairfax: George Mason University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Tullock, G. (1967). The general irrelevance of the general impossibility theorem. Quarterly Journal of Economics 81: 256–270.Google Scholar
  32. Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of monopolies, tariffs and theft. Western Economic Journal 5: 224–232.Google Scholar
  33. Tullock, G. (1967). Towards a mathematics of politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  34. Tullock, G. (Ed.). (1966/7). Papers on non-market decision making. Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia.Google Scholar
  35. Tullock, G. (1966). The organization of inquiry. Durham: Duke University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Tullock, G. (1966). Gains-from-trade in votes (with J.M. Buchanan). Ethics 76: 305–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Tullock, G. (1965). The politics of bureaucracy. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press.Google Scholar
  38. Tullock, G. (1965). Entry barriers in politics. American Economic Review 55: 458–466.Google Scholar
  39. Tullock, G. (1962). Entrepreneurial politics. Charlottesville: Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy, University of Virginia.Google Scholar
  40. Tullock, G. (1959). Problems of majority voting. Journal of Political Economy 67: 571–579.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Campbell, C.D. and Tullock, G. (1954). Hyperinflation in China, 1937–49. Journal of Political Economy 62: 236–245.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Other references

  1. Becker, G.S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. The Journal of Political Economy 76: 169–217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Biennen, H. and van de Walle, N. (1989). Time and power in Africa. American Political Science Review 83: 19–34.Google Scholar
  3. Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy 56: 23–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Buchanan, J.M. (1987). The qualities of a natural economist. In C. Rowley (Ed.), Democracy and public choice, 9–19. New York: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  5. Congleton, R.D. (1988). An overview of the contractarian public finance of James Buchanan. Public Finance Quarterly 16: 131–157.Google Scholar
  6. Congleton, R.D. (1980). Competitive process, competitive waste, and institutions. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, and G. Tullock (Eds.), Towards a theory of the rent-seeking society, 153–179. Texas A & M Press.Google Scholar
  7. Hirshliefer, J. (2001). The dark side of the force: Economic foundations of conflict theory. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Johnson, P. (1997). A history of the American people. NewYork:Harper.Google Scholar
  9. Krueger, A.O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review 64: 291–303.Google Scholar
  10. McKelvey, R.D. (1979). General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. Econometrica 47: 1085–1112.Google Scholar
  11. Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. American Political Science Review 87: 567–576.Google Scholar
  12. Posner, R.E. (1972). Economic analysis of the law. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.Google Scholar
  13. Shepsle, K.A. and Weingast, B.R. (1981). Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice. Public Choice 37: 503–519.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Wintrobe, R. (1990). The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship. American Political Science Review 84: 849–872.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roger D. Congleton
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Study of Public ChoiceGeorge Mason UniversityFairfaxU.S.A.

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