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Public Choice

, Volume 121, Issue 3–4, pp 455–480 | Cite as

North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

  • A. Caparrós
  • J.-C. Péreau
  • T. Tazdaït
Article

Abstract

This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement.

Keywords

Climate Change Public Finance Change Policy Asymmetric Information Climate Change Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. Caparrós
    • 1
  • J.-C. Péreau
    • 2
  • T. Tazdaït
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Economics, Institute of Economics and Geography (IEG)Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC)MadridSpain
  2. 2.OEPUniversity of Marne-la-ValléeMarne la Vallée Cedex 2France
  3. 3.CNRS-EHESS-CIRED Jardin TropicalNogent sur Marne CedexFrance

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