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Political Behavior

, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp 609–628 | Cite as

The Role of Elite Accounts in Mitigating the Negative Effects of Repositioning

  • Joshua Robison
Original Paper

Abstract

Repositioning by political elites plays a key role in a variety of political phenomena, including legislative policymaking and campaigning. While previous studies suggest that repositioning will lead to negative evaluations, these studies have not explored the role of elite communications in structuring mass responses. We argue that this omission is problematic because elite explanations for their actions may limit the costs associated with ‘flip-flopping’ by persuading some citizens to update their attitudes so that they agree with the elite’s new stance and also by molding beliefs about the motives of the elite when repositioning. We present evidence supportive of this argument obtained from two large experiments conducted on samples of American adults. Ultimately, we show that elites offering a satisfactory justification for their change can avoid most, if not all, of the evaluative costs that would otherwise occur. This study thus has important implications not just for this particular element of elite behavior, but also related questions concerning governmental accountability and representation.

Keywords

Explanation Repositioning Communication Persuasion Motives 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I thank Jamie Druckman, Thomas Leeper, Martin Bisgaard, Jennifer Jerit, Jason Barabas, participants in the Political Behavior Workshop at Aarhus University, and two anonymous reviewers for their incisive comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. This article is better for their feedback; all remaining errors remain my own. Study 1 was funded via a Graduate Research Grant from Northwestern University.

Supplementary material

11109_2016_9372_MOESM1_ESM.docx (376 kb)
Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 376 kb)

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science and GovernmentAarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark

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