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Self-deception and selectivity

  • Alfred R. MeleEmail author
Article

Abstract

This article explores the alleged “selectivity problem” for Alfred Mele’s deflationary position on self-deception, a problem that can allegedly be solved only by appealing to intentions to bring it about that one acquires certain beliefs, or to make it easier for oneself to acquire certain beliefs, or to deceive oneself into believing that p. This article argues for the following thesis: (1) the selectivity problem does not undermine this deflationary position on self-deception, and (2) anyone who takes it to be a problem for this position should regard it as being just as serious a problem for those who advocate the intention-featuring solution at issue.

Keywords

Belief Deception Intention Selectivity problem Self-deception 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I presented versions of this article at Error! Main Document Only. Ruhr-University Bochum and the University of Basel. I am grateful to my audiences for their input.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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