Perdurantism, fecklessness and the veil of ignorance

  • Michael Tze-Sung LongeneckerEmail author


There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required isn’t a moral one, but rather an alteration of prudential reasoning. Second, and more importantly, this alteration isn’t necessarily a repugnant one. In fact, given that it prudentially pushes one towards greater impartiality, it may be seen as a point in favor of perdurantism.


Perdurantism Unrestricted composition Personite Morality Prudence Impartiality 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of PhilosophyWuhan UniversityWuhanChina

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