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The puzzles of ground

  • Adam LovettEmail author
Article

Abstract

I outline and provide a solution to some paradoxes of ground.

Keywords

Grounding Puzzles of ground Logic of ground Worldly ground Representational ground Identification 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I’d like to thank Cian Dorr, Kit Fine, Stephen Krämer, Marko Malink and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNew York UniversityNew York CityUSA

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