Epistemic akrasia and higher-order beliefs

  • Timothy KearlEmail author


According to the Fragmentation Analysis, epistemic akrasia is a state of conflict between beliefs formed by the linguistic and non-linguistic belief-formation systems, and epistemic akrasia is irrational because it is a state of conflict between beliefs so formed. I argue that there are cases of higher-order epistemic akrasia, where both beliefs are formed by the linguistic belief-formation system. Because the Fragmentation Analysis cannot accommodate this possibility, the Fragmentation Analysis is incorrect. I consider three objections to the possibility of higher-order epistemic akrasia. Along the way, I offer a revision of the Fragmentation Analysis that can allow for the possibility of higher-order akrasia while avoiding the problems I point out for the original view.


Epistemology Epistemic akrasia Fragmentation Rationality 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ArizonaTucsonUSA

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