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Material through and through

  • Andrew M. BaileyEmail author
Article

Abstract

Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.

Keywords

Materialism Dualism Substance dualism Property dualism 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For helpful discussion and critique of ancestors of this article and its central ideas, I thank a dozen or so anonymous journal referees, Abel Ang, Alex Arnold, Robert Audi, Nathan Ballantyne, Zach Barnett, Paddy Blanchette, Jeff Brower, Amber Carpenter, Sebastian Cortes, Cheryl Cosslett, Daniel Fogal, Scott Hagaman, Hud Hudson, Shieva Kleinschmidt, David Mark Kovacs, Allison Love, Neil Mehta, Ng Sai Ying, Sherice Ngaserin, Laurie Paul, Al Plantinga, Tim Pickavance, Alex Pruss, Josh Ramussen, Mike Rea, Brad Rettler, Jeff Russell, Amy Seymour, Eric Schliesser, Manraaj Singh, Alex Skiles, Meghan Sullivan, Cathy Sutton, Leopold Stubenberg, Allison Krile Thornton, Patrick Todd, Peter van Inwagen, Matt Walker, Josh Wong, Patrick Wu, Eric Yang, Randy Yeo, and Dean Zimmerman.

Funding

Funding was provided by Yale-NUS College (SG) (Grant No. R-607-000-305-115).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale-NUS CollegeSingaporeSingapore

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