Material through and through
Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.
KeywordsMaterialism Dualism Substance dualism Property dualism
For helpful discussion and critique of ancestors of this article and its central ideas, I thank a dozen or so anonymous journal referees, Abel Ang, Alex Arnold, Robert Audi, Nathan Ballantyne, Zach Barnett, Paddy Blanchette, Jeff Brower, Amber Carpenter, Sebastian Cortes, Cheryl Cosslett, Daniel Fogal, Scott Hagaman, Hud Hudson, Shieva Kleinschmidt, David Mark Kovacs, Allison Love, Neil Mehta, Ng Sai Ying, Sherice Ngaserin, Laurie Paul, Al Plantinga, Tim Pickavance, Alex Pruss, Josh Ramussen, Mike Rea, Brad Rettler, Jeff Russell, Amy Seymour, Eric Schliesser, Manraaj Singh, Alex Skiles, Meghan Sullivan, Cathy Sutton, Leopold Stubenberg, Allison Krile Thornton, Patrick Todd, Peter van Inwagen, Matt Walker, Josh Wong, Patrick Wu, Eric Yang, Randy Yeo, and Dean Zimmerman.
Funding was provided by Yale-NUS College (SG) (Grant No. R-607-000-305-115).
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