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Moore, Brentano, and Scanlon: a defense of indefinability

  • Miles TuckerEmail author
Article

Abstract

Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; I argue that they do not succeed.

Keywords

Intrinsic value Moore Brentano Fitting-attitudes Reasons 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I want to thank Phillip Bricker and Peter Graham for their careful and thoughtful comments. I am especially grateful to Bradford Skow, Fred Feldman, Lisa Tucker, and an anonymous referee from Philosophical Studies for all of their help with this essay.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyVirginia Commonwealth UniversityRichmondUSA

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