Weighing epistemic and practical reasons for belief

  • Christopher HowardEmail author


This paper is about how epistemic and practical reasons for belief can be compared against one another when they conflict. It provides a model for determining what one ought to believe, all-things-considered, when there are conflicting epistemic and practical reasons. The model is meant to supplement a form of pluralism about doxastic normativity that I call ‘Inclusivism’. According to Inclusivism, both epistemic and practical considerations can provide genuine normative reasons for belief, and both types of consideration can contribute to (metaphysically) determining what beliefs one ought, all-things-considered, to have.


Ethics of belief Epistemic reasons Practical reasons Alethism Pragmatism 



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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of North CarolinaChapel HillUSA

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