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Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs

  • Mark WalkerEmail author
Article

Abstract

I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to support Moore’s proof an external world, then we should accept that Moore’s Method can be used to support a variety of incompatible metaphysical conclusions. I shall refer to this as “the problem of many proofs”. The problem of many proofs, I claim, stems from the theory-ladenness of perception. I shall argue further that this plethora of proofs for incompatible positions leads to a darker form of skepticism, one which maintains that each of the dogmatic views is probably false. We will conclude by considering various ways a Moorean might respond to these difficulties.

Keywords

Moore Skepticism Proof of an external world 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Tim Cleveland, Peter Hutcheson, and Jean-Paul “Eudicus” Vessel for helpful discussion. Thanks also to an anonymous referee for this journal for some great suggestions and saving me from several embarrassing errors.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Richard L. Hedden Chair of Advanced Philosophical StudiesNew Mexico State UniversityLas CrucesUSA

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