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Temporal existence and temporal location

  • Fabrice CorreiaEmail author
  • Sven Rosenkranz
Article

Abstract

We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avoid using that verb altogether in these contexts and to use quantification and a location predicate instead.

Keywords

Time Existence Location Presentism Tense 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Funding was provided by the European Commission's H2020 programme under grant agreement H2020-MSCA-ITN-2015-675415 and the Swiss National Science Foundation (project BSCGI0_157792).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GenevaGeneva 4Switzerland
  2. 2.ICREA and Department of PhilosophyUniversity of BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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