Temporal existence and temporal location
We argue that sensitivity to the distinction between the tensed notion of being something and the tensed notion of being located at the present time serves as a good antidote to confusions in debates about time and existence, in particular in the debate about how to characterise presentism, and saves us the trouble of going through unnecessary epicycles. Both notions are frequently expressed using the tensed verb ‘to exist’, making it systematically ambiguous. It is a commendable strategy to avoid using that verb altogether in these contexts and to use quantification and a location predicate instead.
KeywordsTime Existence Location Presentism Tense
Funding was provided by the European Commission's H2020 programme under grant agreement H2020-MSCA-ITN-2015-675415 and the Swiss National Science Foundation (project BSCGI0_157792).
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