Causation in terms of production

  • Holger Andreas
  • Mario GüntherEmail author


In this paper, we analyse actual causation in terms of production. The latter concept is made precise by a strengthened Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals: \(A \gg C\) iff, after suspending judgement about A and C, C is believed in the course of assuming A. This test allows us to (epistemically) verify or falsify that an event brings about another event. Complementing the concept of production by a weak condition of difference-making gives rise to a full-fledged analysis of causation.


Actual causation Production Ramsey test Counterfactual dependence and difference-making Belief revision 



We would like to thank Hannes Leitgeb and Andrew Irvine for very valuable advice on earlier versions of the paper. Special thanks are also due to Hans Rott and Paul Bartha for very helpful comments on presentations of the paper. Finally, we are indebted to the anonymous referees for Philosophical Studies. Their comments greatly helped us improve the paper. This research has been supported, in part, by the Graduate School of Systemic Neurosciences.


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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of British Columbia (Okanagan Campus)KelownaCanada
  2. 2.LMU MunichMunichGermany
  3. 3.University of RegensburgRegensburgGermany

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