Promises as invitations to trust
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It is now popular to think that promissory obligation is grounded in an invitation to trust. I object that there are important differences between invitations and promises; appealing to trust faces one of the main problems alleged to face appealing to expectations; and whatever puzzles afflict promissory obligation afflict the obligation not to renege on one’s invitations.
KeywordsPromises Invitations Trust Obligation
Thanks to Joyce Jenkins, Jeff Verman, Sandy Vettese, an anonymous referee, and to members of my 2017 and 2019 seminars on promising, especially R. J. Leland and Sarah Hannan.
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