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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 5, pp 1377–1390 | Cite as

The richness of our tradition: replies to Preston, Gomez-Torrente, and Hanks

  • Scott SoamesEmail author
Article
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Reply to Preston: A new vision for analytic Philosophy?

I am pleased to reply to Aaron Preston’s insightful essay, which places my treatment of ethics in the context of some of my other historical and philosophical work. Because I believe philosophy has made great progress, I have tried, in my historical work, to identify its achievements and failures in order to learn from them. My effort has led me to a broader perspective on the whole of western philosophy, which reflected in my next book, (Soames 2019), The World Philosophy Made. This has meant coming to grips with what is essential to the discipline, and the role it is capable of playing in our lives.

Aware of analytic philosophy’s impressive achievements in some areas, Preston takes it to have been “badly deficient in addressing matters of morality and existential meaning.” I agree that it has done more to advance theoretical knowledge than it has to improve our understanding of moral matters, or to help us live better and more...

Notes

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© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Los AngelesUSA

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