Soames on the logical empiricists on truth, meaning, convention, and logical truth
- 118 Downloads
Scott Soames’s new installment of his series The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, its volume 2, subtitled A New Vision, is one more tour de forcein the author’s historiographic work. The volume devotes well over half of its pages to superb expositions and discussions of doctrines and ideas in philosophy of language, logic and science by adherents or fellow travelers of logical empiricism. In the very limited space I have it is of course impossible to cover every topic that seems to me of special interest in this part of the book. But when reading Soames, I much more often than not discover myself agreeing with him, so any attempt on my part to cover many of Soames’s topics would result in rather unexciting reading anyway. Instead I will focus on a relatively small, but—I think—important set of historical and philosophical issues where I found myself disagreeing to some extent with Soames. These are issues surrounding Tarski’s theory of truth and its connections with the notion of...
- Carnap, R. (1942). Introduction to semantics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- Quine, W. V. (1936). Truth by convention. In O. H. Lee (Ed.), Philosophical essays for A. N. Whitehead. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. (Reprinted in Quine, The ways of paradox and other essays, pp. 70–99, 1966, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) (References to the reprint).Google Scholar
- Quine W. V. (1960). Carnap and logical truth, Synthese, 12, 350–374. (Reprinted in Quine, The ways of paradox and other essays, pp. 100–125, 1966, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.) (References to the reprint).Google Scholar
- Tarski, A. (1936). On the concept of logical consequence. In A. Tarski (Ed.), Logic, semantics, metamathematics (2nd ed., pp. 409–420). Hackett: Indianapolis.Google Scholar