Evaluative predicates as classificatory devices?
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In “Value Ascriptions: Rethinking Cognitivism,” Sigrún Svavarsdóttir offers a novel account of the semantic function of evaluative predication, according to which such predicates function as “linguistically encoded classificatory devices.” This short paper raises three questions about Svavarsdóttir’s account: how it relates to familiar sorts of projects in and about semantics, how to understand the nature of “linguistic encoding,” and how to understand the significance of the account’s central use of sets.
KeywordsMoral semantics Predication Cognitivism Expressivism Minimalism
I am indebted to Sigrún Svavarsdóttir for helpful discussion of her paper, and to Derek Baker and David Plunkett for illuminating comments on a draft of this paper.
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