What we epistemically owe to each other
- 768 Downloads
This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other.
KeywordsEpistemic duties Epistemic obligations Doxastic wronging Ethics of belief Wronging beliefs
For helpful comments and discussions, there are a lot of people I want to draw special attention to and I apologize to anyone I forget. In alphabetical order: Mike Ashfield, Renee Bolinger, Endre Begby, Stephen Bero, Kenny Easwaran, Stephen Finlay, Pamela Hieronymi, Gabbrielle Johnson, Robin Jeshion, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Dustin Locke, Maegan Fairchild, Kathryn Pogin, Mark Schroeder, Regina Rini, Briana Toole, Ralph Wedgwood, and Aaron Zimmerman. Additionally, I’d like to thank audiences at Claremont McKenna College, Princeton University, the 2018 Pacific division meeting of the American Philosophical Association, and the Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference.
- Basu, R. (2018a). Beliefs that wrong. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Southern California.Google Scholar
- Basu, R. (2018b). The Wrongs of racist beliefs. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1137-0.
- Basu, R. (In preparation). Moral encroachment and the moral stakes of racist beliefs. Philosophical Issues.Google Scholar
- Basu, R., & Schroeder, M. (2019). Doxastic wrongings. In B. Kim, & M. McGrath (Eds.), Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology (pp. 181–205). Routledge.Google Scholar
- Beeghly, E. (2018). Failing to treat persons as individuals. Ergo, 5(26), 687–711.Google Scholar
- Bero, S. (MS). Relationships and reactive attitudes.Google Scholar
- Bell, M. (2009). Anger, virtue and oppression. In L. Tessman (Ed.), Feminist ethics and social and political philosophy: Theorizing the non-ideal. Berlin: Springer.Google Scholar
- Darwall, S. (2006). The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and accountability. Harvard: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
- de Beauvoir, S. (1949). The second sex. 2010. Random House.Google Scholar
- DiAngelo, R. (2011). White fragility. International Journal of Critical Pedagogy, 3(3), 54–70.Google Scholar
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1903). The souls of black folk. 1994. Dover.Google Scholar
- Lorde, A. (1984). Eye to eye: Black women, hatred, and anger. In Sister Outsider, (pp. 145–75). Crossing Press.Google Scholar
- Marušić, B. (2015). Evidence and agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2016). Anger and forgiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Parker, P. (1999). For the white person who wants to know how to be my friend. from Movement in Black. Ithaca, NY: Firebrand Books.Google Scholar
- Schroeder, M. (2018a). Persons as things. In Oxford studies in normative ethics. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Srinivasan, A. (2016). Would politics be better off without anger. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/a-righteous-fury/. Accessed 22 Mar 2018
- Strawson, P. (1962). Freedom and resentment. In Freedom and resentment and other essays. 2008. Routledge.Google Scholar
- Williams, P. J. (1992). The alchemy of race and rights. Harvard: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar