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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 4, pp 879–896 | Cite as

The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized

  • Sinan Dogramaci
Article

Abstract

I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.

Keywords

Skepticism Ordinary language Function Ambitious anti-skeptical project 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For their help with this paper I’d like to thank audiences at Arizona State University, Georgia State University, the University of Miami, the University of Nebraska, TEX (the Texas Epistemology Xtravaganza), and the 2018 Pacific APA where Jennifer Nagel gave valuable comments. I’m especially grateful to Yuval Avnur for extensive discussions about the ordinary language argument.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sinan Dogramaci
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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