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Epistemic dilemmas and rational indeterminacy

  • Nick LeonardEmail author
Article
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Abstract

This paper is about epistemic dilemmas, i.e., cases in which one is doomed to have a doxastic attitude that is rationally impermissible no matter what. My aim is to develop and defend a position according to which there can be genuine rational indeterminacy; that is, it can be indeterminate which principles of rationality one should satisfy and thus indeterminate which doxastic attitudes one is permitted or required to have. I am going to argue that this view can resolve epistemic dilemmas in a systematic way while also enjoying some important advantages over its rivals.

Keywords

Rationality Indeterminacy Dilemmas 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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