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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 12, pp 3251–3252 | Cite as

Correction to: The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

  • Kent HurtigEmail author
Correction
  • 238 Downloads

1 Correction to: Philos Stud  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1172-x

Few errors were identified in the original publication of the article. The corrections are as follows:
  1. 1.

    The ‘Abstract’ section should read as below:

     
According to the fitting attitudes (FA) analysis of value, value entails fittingness. In this paper, I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies, respectively), I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper, I try to respond to various objections.
  1. 2.

    On page 6, in the second paragraph, ‘g’ and ‘g*’ should be replaced by ‘q’ and ‘q*’, respectively:

     
Perhaps the FA theorist could respond as follows: In order to contemplate the solitary good of the happy egrets (again calling this q) we don’t need to single out any one particular (non-actual) world at which q obtains; we need only entertain the proposition that there is some world at which q obtains. Now consider some actual solitary good, q*. By hypothesis, no actual person can identify, and so no actual person can contemplate, q*. But why can’t a non-actual person do so? If contemplating g doesn’t require singling out some particular world at which q obtains, why should contemplating q* (or e, or any other actual solitary good or evil) require singling out some particular world?

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Law and PhilosophyUniversity of StirlingStirlingUK

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