Against predicativism about names
According to predicativism about names, names which occur in argument positions have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. In this paper, I shall argue that these bare singular names do not have the same type of semantic contents as predicates. I will present three objections to predicativism—the modal, the epistemic, and the translation objections—and show that they succeed even against the more sophisticated versions of predicativism defended by Fara and Bach.
KeywordsPredicativism Referentialism Name Definite description Rigidity Translation
For insightful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank an anonymous referee, Sam Cumming, Billy Dunaway, Jinho Knag, and audiences at the 2017 CSPA, the 2018 APA Pacific, and the 2018 SEP meetings. I am especially grateful to Nathan Salmon, Dan Korman, Teresa Robertson, and David Mokriski for extremely helpful discussions and comments on previous versions of this paper.
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