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Grounding the normative: a problem for structured non-naturalism

  • Justin Morton
Article
  • 57 Downloads

Abstract

Many non-naturalists about the normative want to endorse the view that some normative facts hold in virtue of both non-normative facts and normative principles. In this paper, I argue that non-naturalism is inconsistent with this thesis, due to the nature of normative principles and their grounds. I then consider two ways in which the nonnaturalist position could be modified or expanded to solve this problem. No solution, it turns out, is without its problems. I end by considering how the non-naturalist can deny that normative facts obtain partially in virtue of principles.

Keywords

Non-naturalism Grounding Principles 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of California, DavisDavisUSA

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