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Factive knowability and the problem of possible omniscience

  • Jan Heylen
Article
  • 66 Downloads

Abstract

Famously, the Church–Fitch paradox of knowability is a deductive argument from the thesis that all truths are knowable to the conclusion that all truths are known. In this argument, knowability is analyzed in terms of having the possibility to know. Several philosophers have objected to this analysis, because it turns knowability into a nonfactive notion. In addition, they claim that, if the knowability thesis is reformulated with the help of factive concepts of knowability, then omniscience can be avoided. In this article we will look closer at two proposals along these lines (Edgington in Mind 94(376):557–568, 1985; Fuhrmann in Synthese 191(7):1627–1648, 2014a), because there are formal models available for each. It will be argued that, even though the problem of omniscience can be averted, the problem of possible or potential omniscience cannot: there is an accessible state at which all (actual) truths are known. Furthermore, it will be argued that possible or potential omniscience is a price that is too high to pay. Others who have proposed to solve the paradox with the help of a factive concept of knowability should take note (Fara in Synthese 173(1):53–73, 2010; Spencer in Mind 126(502):466–497, 2017).

Keywords

Factive knowability Actuality Potential knowledge Knowability thesis Church–Fitch paradox of knowability Possible omniscience Potential omniscience 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of PhilosophyKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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