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On snubbing proximal intentions

  • Alfred R. Mele
Article

Abstract

In the simplest case, a proximal intention is an intention one has now to do something now. Recently, some philosophers have argued that proximal intentions do much less work than they are sometimes regarded as doing. This article rebuts these arguments, explains why the concept of proximal intentions is important for some scientific work on intentional action, and sketches an empirical approach to identifying proximal intentions. Ordinary usage of “intend” and the place of intention in folk psychology and scientific psychology are discussed.

Keywords

Folk psychology Intention Intentional action Ordinary usage Proximal intention 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Florida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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