We cannot infer by accepting testimony
While we can judge and believe things by merely accepting testimony, we cannot make inferences by merely accepting testimony. A good theory of inference should explain this. The theories that are best suited to explain this fact seem to be theories that accept a so-called intuitional construal of Boghossian’s Taking Condition.
KeywordsInference Taking condition Testimony Belief Intuition
I am very grateful for invaluable comments on earlier drafts that I received from John McDowell, Ori Beck, Katharina Nieswandt, Robert Brandom, James Shaw, Karl Schafer, and an anonymous referee.
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