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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 8, pp 2079–2089 | Cite as

Rumfitt on truth-grounds, negation, and vagueness

  • Richard ZachEmail author
Article

Abstract

In The Boundary Stones of Thought (2015), Rumfitt defends classical logic against challenges from intuitionistic mathematics and vagueness, using a semantics of pre-topologies on possibilities, and a topological semantics on predicates, respectively. These semantics are suggestive but the characterizations of negation face difficulties that may undermine their usefulness in Rumfitt’s project.

Keywords

Negation Vagueness Intuitionism Logical pluralism Non-classical logic 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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