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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 7, pp 1873–1885 | Cite as

A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?

  • Yoaav IsaacsEmail author
Article
  • 207 Downloads

Abstract

The epistemology of disagreement standardly divides conciliationist views from steadfast views. But both sorts of views are subject to counterexample—indeed, both sorts of views are subject to the same counterexample. After presenting this counterexample, I explore how the epistemology of disagreement should be reconceptualized in light of it.

Keywords

Disagreement Epistemology Probability 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.UNC Chapel HillChapel HillUSA

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