Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 7, pp 1757–1768 | Cite as

A new defense of trope content view of experience

  • Roberto Horácio de Sá PereiraEmail author


The idea that what we perceive are tropes (abstract particulars) is anything but new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why the ontology of tropes was postulated in the first place. Still, the claim that we perceive tropes is invariably and purely based on pre-philosophical intuitions or, indirectly, either as a supporting argument for the advantages of content view when compared to the relational view of experience, or as a supporting argument in favor of the irreducible subjective character of experience. In this paper, I take the content view for granted and argue in favor of what is herein referred to as the trope-content view of experience. My defense is a case of inference to the best explanation. The trope-content view can meet all reasonable desiderata on the experience and its content without assuming gaps or making the ad hoc assumption that there are different layers of content, or so shall I argue.


Content of experience Tropes Trope-content view Singular content view General content view 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe Federal University from Rio de Janeiro/UFRJ/CNPQRio de JaneiroBrazil

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