Know-how has a distinctive, non-instrumental value that a mere reliable ability lacks. Some, including Bengson and Moffett (in: Bengson, Moffett (eds) Knowing how, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–195, 2011) and Carter and Pritchard (Australas J Philos 93(4):799–816, 2015b) have cited a close relation between knowhow and cognitive achievement, and it is tempting to think that the value of know-how rests in that relation. That’s not so, however. The value of know-how lies in its relation to the fundamental value of autonomy.
KeywordsKnowledge-how Cognitive achievement Autonomy Non-instrumental value Reliable ability
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