Philosophical Studies

, Volume 176, Issue 5, pp 1247–1261 | Cite as

Beauty, odds, and credence

  • Masahiro YamadaEmail author


This paper considers fair betting odds for certain bets that might be placed in the situation discussed in the so-called Sleeping Beauty Problem. This paper examines what Thirders, Halfers, and Double Halfers must say about the odds as determined by various decision theoretic approaches and argues that Thirders and Halfers have difficulties formulating plausible and coherent positions concerning the relevant betting odds. Double Halfers do not face this problem and that is an important consideration in favor of Double Halfers.


Sleeping Beauty problem Double Halfer Decision theory Betting odds 



Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer for insightful comments and suggestions which have made this a much better paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentClaremont Graduate UniversityClaremontUSA

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