I respond to the critical comments by Randolph Clarke, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom on my book Causation and Free Will. I discuss some features of the view that our freedom is exclusively based on actual causes, including the role played in it by absences of reasons, absence causation, modal facts, and finally some additional thoughts on how a compatibilist can respond to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism.
KeywordsFree will Causation Compatibilism Reasons-sensitivity Absence causation Manipulation
Thanks to Randy Clarke, Juan Comesaña, Michael McKenna, Al Mele, and Derk Pereboom for comments on a draft of these replies. I am very grateful to my critics for taking their time to think about the ideas in the book and for their insightful comments.
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