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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 6, pp 1535–1543 | Cite as

On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will

  • Derk PereboomEmail author
Article
  • 243 Downloads

Abstract

In this article I review the core elements of Carolina Sartorio’s actual causal sequence account of free will and moral responsibility, and propose two revisions. First, I suggest replacing the contested notion of absence causation by the relatively uncontroversial notion of causal explanation by absences. Second, I propose retaining explanation by unreduced dispositions, of which Sartorio appears to be wary. I then set out a response to her critical treatment of manipulation arguments against compatibilism. Lastly, I point out that Sartorio’s reasons-sensitivity condition on moral responsibility is amenable to a conception of moral responsibility that, unlike the one she endorses, dispenses with basic desert.

Keywords

Moral responsibility Causation Reasons-sensitivity Compatibilism Absence causation Causal explanation Dispositions Manipulation argument 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Cornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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