Advertisement

Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 6, pp 1525–1533 | Cite as

Diana and Ernie return: on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will

  • Alfred R. MeleEmail author
Article
  • 251 Downloads

Abstract

In the final chapter of her Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio offers (among other things) a novel reply to an original-design argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, an argument that resembles Alfred Mele’s zygote argument in Free Will and Luck. This article assesses the merits of her reply. It is concluded that Sartorio has more work to do if she is to lay this style of argument to rest.

Keywords

Compatibilism Free will Moral responsibility Original-design arguments Zygote argument 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Gabriel DeMarco and Carolina Sartorio for comments on a draft of this article. This article was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

References

  1. Barnes, E. (2015). Freedom, creativity, and manipulation. Noûs, 49, 560–588.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Deery, O., & Nahmias, E. (2017). Defeating manipulation arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood. Philosophical Studies, 174, 1255–1276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Fischer, J. (2011). The zygote argument remixed. Analysis, 71, 267–272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. McKenna, M. (2008). A hard-line rely to pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, 142–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. McKenna, M. (2009). Compatibilism; State of the Art. In E.N Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (winter 2009 edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2018.
  6. McKenna, M. (2014). Resisting the manipulation argument: A hard-liner takes it on the chin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 89, 467–484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Mele, A. (2006). Free will and luck. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Mele, A. (2013). Moral responsibility and the continuation problem. Philosophical Studies, 162, 237–255.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Mele, A. (2017). Aspects of agency: Decisions, abilities, explanations, and free will. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Sartorio, C. (2016). Causation and free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Schlosser, M. (2015). Manipulation and the Zygote Argument: Another Reply. Journal of Ethics, 19, 73–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Todd, P. (2013). Defending (a modified version of) the Zygote argument. Philosophical Studies, 164, 189–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Todd, P. (2017). Manipulation arguments and the freedom to do otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95, 395–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Waller, R. (2014). The threat of effective intentions to moral responsibility in the Zygote argument. Philosophia, 42, 209–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

Personalised recommendations