Diana and Ernie return: on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will
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In the final chapter of her Causation and Free Will, Carolina Sartorio offers (among other things) a novel reply to an original-design argument for the thesis that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility, an argument that resembles Alfred Mele’s zygote argument in Free Will and Luck. This article assesses the merits of her reply. It is concluded that Sartorio has more work to do if she is to lay this style of argument to rest.
KeywordsCompatibilism Free will Moral responsibility Original-design arguments Zygote argument
I am grateful to Gabriel DeMarco and Carolina Sartorio for comments on a draft of this article. This article was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
- McKenna, M. (2009). Compatibilism; State of the Art. In E.N Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (winter 2009 edition). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/supplement.html. Accessed 16 Feb 2018.