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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 6, pp 1517–1524 | Cite as

Free will, causation, and absence

  • Randolph ClarkeEmail author
Article
  • 484 Downloads

Abstract

This paper comments on Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will, challenging the non-modal conception of reasons-sensitivity that Sartorio advances.

Keywords

Absences Causation Frankfurt cases Free will Reasons Reasons-sensitivity 

Notes

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Marcela Herdova, Stephen Kearns, Michael McKenna, and Al Mele for discussion of the issues treated here.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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