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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 175, Issue 4, pp 973–980 | Cite as

Judgmental alternatives, empathy, and moral responsibility

  • Matthew TalbertEmail author
Article
  • 247 Downloads

Abstract

In Responsibility From the Margins, David Shoemaker distinguishes three forms of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. The introduction of various normative competence requirements lends precision to the contrasts that Shoemaker draws between these forms of responsibility. I argue, however, that these competence requirements are less well motivated than Shoemaker supposes, which raises the possibility that we cannot distinguish between forms of responsibility in the way that he hopes.

Keywords

Accountability Anger Answerability Attributability Empathy 

References

  1. Shoemaker, D. (2015). Responsibility from the margins. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Wolf, S. (1987). Sanity and the metaphysics of responsibility. In F. Schoeman (Ed.), Responsibility, character, and the emotions (pp. 46–62). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.West Virginia UniversityMorgantownUSA

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